1. An Economist’s Perspective on Match-fixing and Self-sabotage in Contests

dc.contributor.author	Bibhas Saha
dc.date.accessioned	2016-07-23T06:36:26Z
dc.date.available	2016-07-23T06:36:26Z
dc.date.issued	2015-07
dc.identifier.issn	2277-9752
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/2259/894
dc.description	IIM Kozhikode Society & Management Review 4(2) 77–85 © 2015 Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode	en_US
dc.description.abstract	In this note we provide an economist’s perspective on self-sabotage in contests. When such self-sabotage is engineered at the behest of a third party for financial gains from betting markets, we see the twin problems of self-sabotage and betting corruption, which are known as the problem of match-fixing in sporting contests. We discuss the hidden incentives that different agents face in this environment. To curb match-fixing, legalization of betting would be a positive step followed by intelligent enforcement. Further, using a simple model we demonstrate that the risk of match-fixing diminishes with the number of teams involved in the contest.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.publisher	Sage Publications	en_US
dc.subject	Sports betting	en_US
dc.subject	Corruption	en_US
dc.subject	Match-fixing	en_US
dc.subject	Self-sabotage	en_US
dc.title	1. An Economist’s Perspective on Match-fixing and Self-sabotage in Contests	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US